GeneSyst: a Tool to Reason about Behavioral Aspects of B Event
  Specifications. Application to Security Properties. by Bert, Didier et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
00
4.
14
72
v1
  [
cs
.L
O]
  9
 A
pr
 20
10
GeneSyst: a Tool to Reason about
Behavioral Aspects of B Event Specifications.
Application to Security Properties⋆
Didier Bert, Marie-Laure Potet, and Nicolas Stouls
Laboratoire Logiciels Syste`mes Re´seaux - LSR-IMAG - Grenoble, France
{Didier.Bert, Marie-Laure.Potet, Nicolas.Stouls}@imag.fr
Abstract. In this paper, we present a method and a tool to build sym-
bolic labelled transition systems from B specifications. The tool, called
GeneSyst, can take into account refinement levels and can visualize the
decomposition of abstract states in concrete hierarchical states. The re-
sulting symbolic transition system represents all the behaviors of the
initial B event system. So, it can be used to reason about them. We il-
lustrate the use of GeneSyst to check security properties on a model of
electronic purse.
1 Introduction
Formal methods, such as the B method [1], ensure that the development of an
application is reliable and that properties expressed in the model are satisfied by
the final program. However, they do not guarantee that this program fulfills the
informal requirements, nor the needs of the customer. So, it is useful to propose
several views about the specifications, in order to be sure that the initial model
is suitable for the customer and that the development can continue on this basis.
One of these important insights is the representation of the behavior of programs
by means of diagrams (statecharts). Moreover, some particular views, if they are
themselves formal, can provide new means to prove properties that cannot easily
be checked in the first model.
In this paper, we present a method and a tool to extract a labelled transition
system from a model written in event-B. The transition system gives a graphical
view and represents symbolically all the behaviors of the B model. The method
is able to take into account refinement levels and to show the correspondence
between abstract and concrete systems, by means of hierarchical states.
We present also an application of this tool, namely, the verification of secu-
rity properties. The security properties assert the occurrence or the absence of
some particular events in some situation. They are a case of atomicity property
of transactions. This is illustrated by an example of specification of an elec-
tronic purse, called Demoney[16, 15], developed in the SecSafe project [19]. This
⋆ This work was done in the GECCOO project of program “ACI : Se´curite´ Informa-
tique” supported by the French Ministry of Research and New Technologies. It is
also suported by CNRS and ST-Microelectronics by the way of a doctoral grant.
case study, written in Java Card [21], is an applet that has all the facilities
required by a real electronic purse. Indeed, the purse can be debited from a
terminal in a shop, credited by cash or from a bank account with a terminal in
a bank or managed from special terminal in bank restricted area. Transactions
are encrypted if needed and different levels of security are used depending on
the actions. Demoney also supports to communicate with another applet on the
card, for example, to manage award points on a loyalty plan. The specification
of Demoney is public in version 0.8 [16], but the source code is copyrighted by
Trusted Logic S.A.1.
In Section 2, we recall the main features of event-B systems and refinements.
We introduce a notion of behavioral semantics by the way of sequences of events.
In Section 3, we define symbolic labelled transition systems (SLTS) and the
links between SLTS and event-B systems are stated. In Section 4, we present
the GeneSyst tool and an example of generation of SLTS dealing with the error
cases in the Demoney case study. Section 5 presents security properties required
in the application and shows how the GeneSyst diagrams can be used to check
these properties. Then, we review related works, and we conclude the paper with
some research perspectives in Section 6.
2 Event-B
2.1 General presentation
Event-B was introduced by J.-R. Abrial [2, 3]. It is a formal development method
as well as a specification language. In event-B, components are composed of con-
stant declarations (sets, constants, properties), state specification (vari-
ables, invariant), initialisation and set of events. The events are defined by
e =̂ eBody where e is the name of the event and eBody is a guarded generalized
substitution [1]. The events do not take parameters and do not return result
values. They do not get preconditions and do terminate. Their effect is only to
modify the internal state. If S is a component, then we denote by Interface(S)
the set of its events.
A well-typed and well-defined component is consistent if initialization Init
establishes the invariant of the component and if each event preserves the invari-
ant. So, using the notation [S]R as the weakest precondition of R for substitution
S, the consistency of a component is expressed by the proof obligations: [Init ]I
and I ⇒ [eBody ]I for each event.
In the paper, we use the notions of before-after predicate of substitution
T for variables x (prdx(T )) and the feasability predicate of a substitution as
defined in the B-Book: fis(T )⇔ ¬[T ]false [1]. Finally, the notation 〈T 〉R means
¬[T ]¬R, that is to say, there exists a computation of T which terminates in a
state verifying R.
1 http://www.trusted-logic.fr/
2.2 Events and traces
The events have the form “e =̂ G =⇒ T ” where G is a predicate, T is a
generalized substitution such that I ∧ G ⇒ fis(T ). Predicate G is called the
guard of e and T is its action. They are respectively denoted by Guard(e) and
Action(e). If the syntactic definition of an event e =̂ S does not fulfill this
form, it can be built by computing e =̂ fis(S) =⇒ S. Following the so-called
event-based approach [10], the semantics of event-B systems can be chosen to be
the set of all the valid sequences of event executions.
Definition 1 (Traces of Event-B systems) A finite sequence of event occur-
rences e0.e1.e2 . . . en is a trace of system S if and only if e0 is the initialisation
of S, {e1, e2, . . . , en} ⊆ Interface(S) and fis(e0 ; e1 ; e2 ; . . . ; en)⇔ true.
The set of all the finite traces of a system S is called Traces(S). For the initial-
isation, one can notice that prdx(Init) does not depend on the initial values of
the variables and that Guard(Init)⇔ true. The following property characterizes
traces by the existence of intermediary states xi in which the guard of ei holds
and where the pair (xi, xi+1) is in the before-after predicate of event ei:
Property 1 (Trace characterization) Let x be the variable space of system
S, then: e0.e1. . . . en ∈ Traces(S) ⇔
∃x0, . . . , xn+1 ·
∧n
i=0([x := xi]Guard(ei) ∧ [x, x
′ := xi, xi+1]prdx(Action(ei)))
2.3 Event-B refinement
In the event-B method, a refinement is a component called refinement. The
variables can be refined (i.e. made more concrete) and a gluing invariant de-
scribes the relationship between the variables of the refinement and those of the
abstraction. The events of refinement R must at least contain those of the ab-
straction S (i.e. Interface(S) ⊆ Interface(R)). The other events are called new
events.
We recall here the proof obligations of system refinements. Let I be the invari-
ant of the abstraction S and J be the invariant of refinement R, then the gluing
invariant is the conjunction I∧J . The refinement is performed elementwise, that
is to say, the abstract initialisation is refined by the concrete initialisation and
each abstract event is refined by its concrete counterpart. Proof obligations that
establish the consistency of refinements are :
For initialisation Init : [InitR]〈InitS〉J
For events e of Interface(S) : I ∧ J ⇒ [eR]〈eS〉J
For the new events neR : I ∧ J ⇒ [neR]〈skip〉J
New events cannot indefinitely take the control, i.e. the refined system cannot
diverge more often that the abstract one. So, a variant V is declared in the refined
system, as an expression on a well-founded set (usually the natural numbers),
and the new events must satisfy (v is a fresh variable) :
V is a natural expression : I ∧ J ⇒ V ∈ N
New events neR decrease the variant : I ∧ J ⇒ [v := V ][neR](V < v)
Finally, a proof obligation of liveness preservation is usually required. If S con-
tains m events and R contains p new events, then:
I ∧ J ⇒ (
∨m
i=1 Guard(e
S
i )⇒ (
∨m
i=1Guard(e
R
i ) ∨
∨p
i=1 Guard(ne
R
i )))
Traces associated to refinements are defined as for the systems.
3 Symbolic labelled transition systems associated to B
systems
3.1 Symbolic transition systems
We define symbolic labelled transition systems:
Definition 2 (Symbolic labelled transition system) A symbolic labelled tran-
sition system (SLTS) is a 4-uple (N, Init , U,W ) where
- N is a set of states, and Init is the initial state (Init ∈ N)
- U is a set of labels of the form (D,A, e), where D and A are predicates and
e is an event name
- W is a transition relation W ⊆ P(N × U ×N).
A transition (E, (D,A, e), F ) means that, in state E, the event e is enabled
if D holds and, starting from state E, if event e is enabled, then it reaches state
F if A holds. Predicate D is called the enabledness predicate and A is called the
reachability predicate.
States N are interpreted as subsets of variable spaces on variables x. So, the
interpretation of N is given by a function I such that I(E) is a predicate on free
variables x which characterizes the subset represented by E. In the next defini-
tion, we determine the actual conditions to cross a transition from a particular
state value x1 of E1 to x2 of E2 by an event e which is defined in an event-B
system S. For that, e must be enabled in x1, x2 must be reachable from x1 by
e, and (x1, x2) must belong to the before-after predicate of e:
Definition 3 (Transition crossing) Let (E1, (D,A, e), E2) be a transition of
a SLTS T on a system S, and given x1 and x2 some values of the state variables
x which satisfy the invariant of S, then a crossing from x1 to x2 by this transition
is legal if and only if : 1. [x := x1](I(E1) ∧D ∧ A)
2. [x, x′ := x1, x2] prdx(Action(e))
3. [x := x2]I(E2)
Such a legal transition crossing is denoted by :
(E1, x1) 
(D,A,e)
 (E2, x2)
Now, we introduce the notion of path in a symbolic labelled transition system.
A path is a sequence of event occurrences, starting from the initial state, which
goes over a transition system through legal transition crossings.
Definition 4 (Paths) Given a symbolic labelled transition system T on a sys-
tem S, a sequence of event occurrences e0. . . . .en+1 is a path in T if there exists
a list of states E0, . . . , En+1 of N , with E0 = InitT , and a list of transitions
(Di, Ai, ei), i ∈ 0..n, such that :
∃x0, . . . , xn+1 · (
∧n
i=0((Ei, xi) 
(Di,Ai,ei)
 (Ei+1, xi+1)))
The set of all the finite paths of T is called Paths(T ).
3.2 Construction of states and transitions
The aim of this section is to show how to compute a SLTS, from an event-B
system S and given a set of states N . First, to build the states N , consider a
list of predicates {P1, . . . , Pn} on the variable space. We require that this set is
complete with respect to the invariant, i.e. all the states specified by the invariant
are included in the states determined by the Pi predicates, i.e.
I ⇒
n∨
i=1
Pi
Then, the states of the SLTS areN = {InitS , E1, . . . , En} with the interpretation
defined by:
I(InitS) = true I(Ei) = Pi ∧ I, i ∈ 1..n
We denote by N1 the set N − {InitS}. From the completeness property above
and the definition of N , we get: I ⇔
∨n
i=1 I(Ei).
Now, we express the conditions to ensure that a symbolic labelled transition
system T represents the same set of behaviors as the associated system S. For
that, in a starting state E, the enabledness condition must be equivalent to the
guard of the event e, and if the target state is F , the reachability condition must
be equivalent to the possibility to reach F through e, when the enabledness
predicate holds, so the condition:
Condition 1 (Valid transitions) Let S be a system, E and F two states in
N as defined above, and e an event, then the transition (E,(D,A,e),F) is valid if
and only if predicates D and A satisfy :
a) I(E) ⇒ (D ⇔ Guard(e))
b) I(E) ∧Guard(e) ⇒ (A ⇔ 〈Action(e)〉I(F ))
Notice that, by applying the definition of the conjugate weakest precondition,
condition b) is equivalent to :
I(E) ∧Guard(e) ⇒ (A ⇔ ∃x′ · (prdx(Action(e)) ∧ [x := x
′]I(F )))
A SLTS with all the transitions valid with respect to a system S is called a valid
symbolic labelled transition system.
Theorem 1 (Traces and paths equality) Let S be an event-B system with
invariant I and events Ev and let T be a valid symbolic labelled transition system
built from S, then:
Traces(S) = Paths(T )
Proof: We prove that, for all t, t ∈ Paths(T )⇔ t ∈ Traces(S).
The path t =̂ e0.e1. . . . .en is a path for the state sequence E0, E1, . . . , En+1 iff
(Definition 4): ∃x0, . . . , xn+1 ·
∧n
i=0((Ei, xi) 
(Di,Ai,ei)
 (Ei+1, xi+1))
By using Definition 3, we get:
∃x0, . . . , xn+1 ·
∧n
i=0([x := xi](I(Ei) ∧Di ∧Ai)
∧ [x, x′ := xi, xi+1]prdx(Action(ei)) ∧ [x := xi+1]I(Ei+1))
By Condition 1, one can replaceDi byGuard(ei) andAi by ∃x
′·(prdx(Action(ei))∧
[x := x′]I(Ei+1)). The formula above is simplified and becomes:
(1) ∃x0, . . . , xn+1 ·
∧n
i=0([x := xi](I(Ei) ∧Guard(ei))
∧ [x, x′ := xi, xi+1]prdx(Action(ei)) ∧ [x := xi+1]I(Ei+1))
We must prove that this formula is equivalent to the characterization of the
traces (Property 1):
(2) ∃x0, . . . , xn+1 ·
∧n
i=0([x := xi]Guard(ei)
∧ [x, x′ := xi, xi+1]prdx(Action(ei)) ∧ [x := xi+1]I)
Implication (1)⇒ (2) is verified because states Ei are such that I(Ei)⇒ I (Sec-
tion 3.2). To prove (2) ⇒ (1), we must exhibit a list of states E0, E1, . . . , En+1
such that these states satisfy (1). This follows from the fact that I(E0) = true
and from I ⇒
∨n
i=1 I(Ei), which ensures that one of the states I(Ei) necessarily
holds when I hold. ✷
3.3 Labelled transition systems for the refinements
We propose now the construction of a symbolic labelled transition system for
the refinements. Our aim is to highlight the links between abstract and concrete
transition systems, while preserving the overall structure of the abstract system.
One aspect of the refinement is the change of the variable representation and
redefinition of the events of the abstraction, according to the new representation.
The point is taken into account by the notion of state projection.
In the following, S is a specification, R is its refinement with gluing invariant
L, and T S is a symbolic labelled transition system for S. States ES and FS are
states in T S . We assume that the variable set xS of S is disjoint to the variable
set xR of the refinement. If some variables of the specification are kept in the
refinement, they can be renamed and an equality between both variables is added
to the invariant.
Definition 5 (State projection) Let S be a system with variables xS and R
be the refinement of S according to L. A state ER of T R, ER 6= InitR is the
projection of ES of T S , denoted by ER = ProjL(E
S), iff:
I(ER)⇔ ∃xS · (L ∧ I(ES))
We propose to build a SLTS, called ProjL(T
S), in which states are automat-
ically deduced from abstract states and gluing invariant. The SLTS projection
ProjL(T
S) of the refinement R of system S with gluing invariant L is such that:
the initial state is any q0 with I(q0) = true; the other states of the projection
are the projections of abstract states, i.e. N1R = {ProjL(q) | q ∈ N1
S}. The
transitions are (ER, (D′, A′, eR), FR) where eR ∈ R and D′, A′ are such that
Condition 1 is satisfied. A transition (ER, (D′, A′, eR), FR) is said a projection of
transition (ES , (D,A, eS), FS) iff ER = ProjL(E
S), FR = ProjL(F
S) and event
eR is the refinement of eS . By construction, Paths(ProjL(T
S)) = Traces(R).
This equality can be proved in the same way as in Theorem 1.
Property 2 (Transition projection) With the definitions above,
let (ER, (D′, A′, eR), FR) be the projection of transition (ES , (D,A, eS), FS),
then we have:
I(ES) ∧ L ∧ D′ ⇒ D
This property says that any transition enabled from a state ProjL(E
S) in a
refinement R actually must be enabled in specification S (if the refinement is
proved correct). Property 2 can make the computation of the transitions sim-
pler. Indeed, if e ∈ Interface(S), then, for all the transitions (ES , e, FS) of the
abstraction, it is only necessary to examine the transitions (ProjL(E
S), e, E′)
with E′ ∈ N1R. No other transition can be labelled by e from this state.
Another key aspect of refinement is the refinement of behaviors. New events
may be introduced that make the actions more detailed. These new events are
not observable at the abstract level, as the stuttering in TLA [11]. Very often,
new variables are introduced. Thus, it is useful to visualize the states referring
to these variable changes. In order to preserve the structure of the abstract
system, we choose to refine each abstract state in an independent way. So, the
transitions, relative to events which belong to Interface(S), are preserved by the
introduction of hierarchical states.
Definition 6 (Hierarchical states) A set of sub-states {ER1 , . . . , E
R
m} can be
associated to a super-state ProjL(E
S) of R if and only if
m∨
i=1
I(ERi )⇔ I(ProjL(E
S))
In a refined system, the user must decide what projections of abstract states
are decomposed and s/he must provide the predicates of the decomposition.
If the abstract states are disjoint, then the transitions associated to the new
events appear only between the sub-states of a hierarchical state. An example
of refinement with decomposition of states is given in Section 4.4.
4 The GeneSyst tool
4.1 Presentation
The GeneSyst tool is intended to generate a symbolic labelled transition system
T from an event-B system S and a set of states N . Such a generated SLTS
will be denoted by T (S, N). The input of the tool is a B component, where
the assertions clause contains the formula P1 ∨ . . . ∨ Pn, which characterizes
the list of predicates {P1, . . . , Pn}. By this way, the condition of completeness
(section 3.2) is generated as proof obligation.
We give a sketch of the algorithm which computes the transitions of T (S, N):
it uses three main variables: the set of visited states, visited, the set of processed
states, processed, and the set of computed transitions tr. First, the initial state
is put in the visited set. Then each state E in the visited set is processed: this
consists in computing the transitions (E, (D,A, e), F ) with all events e to all
non-initial states F of the system. Predicates D and A are determined following
the algorithm defined in the following section. If D or A are not false then the
transition (E, (D,A, e), F ) is added to tr, and if F has not been processed, it
is put in the visited set. After the processing of state E, E is removed from
visited and put in set processed. When visited is empty, then tr contains all
the computed transitions of T (S, N) and processed contains the set of reachable
states. The algorithm terminates, because the set of states to be visited is finite
(bounded by the cardinal of N). This algorithm guarantees that the resulting
SLTS is a valid transition system for S, with given states N .
4.2 Proof obligations
A subprocedure of the algorithm is to determine effectively the enabledness
predicate and the reachability predicate, given a triple (E, e, F ). For sake of
usability of the resulting transition system, it is interesting to examine three
cases: predicates are true, false or other. This information can be obtained by
proof obligations. In Fig. 1, we give the conditions for the calculus of these
predicates. Obviously, if D and/or A is false , then the transition is not possible.
Proof obligations D for (E, e, F )
(1) ∀x · (I(E)⇒ Guard(e)) true
(2) ∀x · (I(E)⇒ ¬Guard(e)) false
(3) ∃x · (I(E) ∧Guard(e)) Guard(e)
Proof obligations A for (E, e, F )
(4) ∀x · (I(E) ∧Guard(e)⇒ 〈Action(e)〉I(F )) true
(5) ∀x · (I(E) ∧Guard(e)⇒ [Action(e)]¬I(F )) false
(6) ∃x · (I(E) ∧Guard(e) ∧ 〈Action(e)〉I(F )) 〈Action(e)〉I(F )
Fig. 1. Proof obligations for enabledness and reachability
In practice, the GeneSyst tool computes the proof obligations (POs) above
and interacts with AtelierB to discharge the POs. For each triple (E, e, F ):
1. if proof obligation (1) is automatically discharged then D is true.
2. if proof obligation (2) is automatically discharged then D is false and tran-
sition (E, e, F ) does not occur in the resulting T (S, N).
3. otherwise, D is Guard(e) by default.
Then, after cases 1. and 3., GeneSyst computes the proof obligations for deter-
mining the reachability predicate A.
4. if proof obligation (4) is automatically discharged then A is true.
5. if proof obligation (5) is automatically discharged then A is false and tran-
sition (E, e, F ) does not occur in the resulting T (S, N).
6. otherwise, the transition is kept with 〈Action(e)〉 I(F ) as A, by default.
We can notice that Condition 1 about the validity of the transitions is well
satisfied by construction. The by default cases in 3. and 6. correspond to several
possibilities. Either there exist values in state E for which the transition is cross-
able (guard of e is true and state F is reachable), or there are not (the guard
is false or state F is not reachable). However, in both possibilities, these tran-
sitions are included in the resulting transition system. To manage this feature,
we define the notion of minimal symbolic labelled transition system.
Definition 7 (Minimal SLTS) A minimal SLTS is a SLTS where all the tran-
sitions are valid, i.e. satisfy a) and b) of Condition 1, and also satisfy:
c) D 6⇔ false and A 6⇔ false
A SLTS built by GeneSyst is minimal if all the proof obligations of D and A
have been effectively discharged in step 1. or 2. and step 4. or 5. in the algorithm
above. To minimize the number of by-default transitionss, we have designed two
variants of the algorithm. The first optional alternative of the algorithm is to
change cases 3. and 6. into:
3’. if proof obligation (3) is automatically discharged, then D is Guard(e) by
proof, otherwise, D is Guard(e) by default.
6’. if proof obligation (6) is automatically discharged, then A is 〈Action(e)〉 I(F )
by proof, otherwise, the transition is kept with 〈Action(e)〉 I(F ) as A by
default.
Another option of the tool allows the user to get the POs which have not been
automatically discharged. Then, s/he can do an interactive proof to complete
the work and return the information that the PO is discharged or not. However,
the interactive mode is not very practicable when there are a great number of
proof obligations that are not automatically discharged. It becomes useful to
check actually the absence of some critical transitions (cases 2. and 4.).
4.3 Transition systems associated to the Demoney case study
In Fig. 2, we give an example of transition system generated from a subset of
the abstract specification of the Demoney case study. The B machine is provided
in appendix. We just have represented four methods imposed by the Demoney
specification [16]: InitializeTransaction, CompleteTransaction, Reset and Get-
Data. The two methods InitializeTransaction and CompleteTransaction have to
be executed in sequence. If they are called in the wrong order then an error must
be returned. Moreover, any other methods cannot be invoked between them, ex-
cept the method Reset which models the extraction of the card from the terminal.
If it is called during a transaction, all the internal variables must be restored at
their initial values. Finally, method GetData has been defined to represent any
other method which plays a neutral roˆle with respect to transactions.
Let us notice that our model has been expressed with events. In the applet De-
money, methods have neither parameters nor result, because they communicate
through a global variable, named APDU, which allows the information transfert
between the card and the terminal. An error can be returned by means of the
same variable. Finally, methods have no precondition, because they are callable
at any time. So the transformation of methods in events is straightforward.
In the diagrams generated by GeneSyst, transitions are prefixed by the infor-
mation about predicatesD and A. A predicate denoted by “[ ]” means true, while
“[G]” means that the transition is computed by cases 3. or 6. (see section 4.2).
QInit
[ ] [ ] InitializeTransaction
[ ] [ ] CompleteTransaction [ ] [ ] Init
Error = TRUE Error = FALSE
[ ] [ ] GetData
[ ] [ ] Reset
[ ] [G] GetData
[ ] [G] GetData
[ ] [ ] Reset
[ ] [ ] InitializeTransaction 
[ ] [G] CompleteTransaction 
[ ] [ ] InitializeTransaction
[ ] [G] InitializeTransaction
[ ] [G] CompleteTransaction 
Fig. 2. Transition system associated to the error detection in the Demoney specification
Fig. 2 points out cases in which errors can occur. Transitions have no enabled-
ness condition, because all the guards are true in the model. Some reachability
conditions do not reduce to true, as for the event GetData, which is defined by:
GetData = if EngagedTrans = TRUE then
Error := TRUE || EngagedTrans := FALSE
else Error := FALSE end;
From state Error = FALSE, event GetData can reach the state Error = TRUE with
the condition EngagedTrans = TRUE and stays in Error = FALSE otherwise. Let us
remark also that GetData is enabled in state Error = TRUE and always reaches
state Error = FALSE because of the invariant Error = TRUE ⇒ EngagedTrans =
FALSE.
4.4 Transition system associated to a refinement of Demoney
In our refinement of Demoney, the boolean variable Error is changed into a value
of a given set StatusType, which intends to describe error codes, as imposed by
the specification [16]. In the same way, the boolean variable EngagedTrans is
refined into a value of a given set TransactionType , which indicates the exact
type of the current transaction. Finally, we have introduced the channel with
two levels of security (FALSE and TRUE). All this information is declared in the
invariant below (see also the refinement in appendix):
invariant
StatusWord ∈ StatusType ∧ CurTransaction ∈ TransactionType ∧
ChannelIsSecured ∈ BOOL ∧
((Error = FALSE)⇔ (StatusWord = ISO Ok)) ∧
((EngagedTrans = FALSE) ⇔ (CurTransaction = None)) ∧
((CurTransaction 6= None) ⇒ (ChannelIsSecured = TRUE)) ∧
((StatusWord 6= ISO Ok) ⇒ (CurTransaction = None))
Fig. 3 is built from this refinement. State Error = FALSE, which corresponds
to StatusWord = ISO Ok, is split into two states according to that a transaction
is engaged or not.
[ ] [ ] Reset
[ ] [ ] GetData 
[ ] [ ] CompleteTransaction 
[ ] [ ] Reset
[ ] [ ] GetData
[ ] [ ] InitializeTransaction 
[ ] [ ] GetData 
[ ] [ ] Reset
(StatusWord = ISO_Ok & 
(StatusWord = ISO_Ok & 
[ ] [ ] InitializeTransaction
[ ] [ ] CompleteTransaction 
QInit
Error = FALSE
≠StatusWord     ISO_Ok 
[ ] [G] InitializeTransaction 
[ ] [G] InitializeTransaction 
[ ] [ ] CompleteTransaction 
  CurTransaction = None)
≠CurTransaction     None )
Error = TRUE
[ ] [ ] Init
[ ] [ ] InitializeTransaction
Fig. 3. Transition system associated to the refinement of the error detection
As expressed in Definition 6, the predicate given to GeneSyst to describe the
states has to be a conjonction of equivalences between an abstract state and a
disjonction of refined states. This predicate is written in the assertion clause.
For example, the assertion below has been used to generate Fig. 3.
((Error = TRUE) ⇔ ((StatusWord 6= ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction = None)
∨ (StatusWord 6= ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction 6= None)))
∧
((Error = FALSE)⇔ ((StatusWord = ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction = None)
∨ (StatusWord = ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction 6= None)))
With the splitting of the state Error = FALSE, transition conditions are
simplified in true or false or, in the worst case, are unchanged. For example,
in Fig. 2, the transition labelled by [ ][G]CompleteT ransaction and going from
Error = FALSE to Error = TRUE is, in Fig. 3, going from StatusWord = ISO Ok∧
CurTransaction = None to StatusWord 6= ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction = None with
the label [ ][ ]CompleteT ransaction. So, its reachability has been made more pre-
cise. The same effect occurs on transition [ ][G]CompleteT ransaction going from
Error = FALSE to Error = FALSE, which is refined by [ ][ ]CompleteT ransaction
going from CurTransaction 6= None to CurTransaction = None in the super-state
Error = FALSE. These two specializations are directly due to the introduction of
the CurTransaction variable.
5 Verification of Security Properties on Demoney
In this section we propose a formalism to express properties relative to security
aspects and we show how GeneSyst can be used to verify these properties. We
will next give a concrete example relative to the Demoney case study.
5.1 Properties
Generally, security is designed and implemented through different levels of ab-
straction. Security policies are defined by a set of rules according to which the
system can be regulated, in order to guarantee expected properties, as confi-
dentiality or integrity. Security policies are then implemented through software
and hardware functions, called security mechanisms. Such an approach has been
adopted by the Common Criteria norm [8] which proposes, through the notion
of assurance requirements, a catalogue of security policies and a hierarchy of
mechanisms.
In this paper we focus on security properties relative to constraints on the
global behavior of the system, as authentication procedures or access control. In
this case, security requirements can be seen as constraints on the execution order
of atomic actions, as operation calls. F. Schneider claims in [18] that automata
are a well-adapted formalism which can, both, be used to specify some forms of
security policies and to control implementations during their execution. On the
other hand, K. Trentelman and M. Huisman [22] propose a logic that can be
used also to express some forms of security properties, as temporal properties
on JML specifications.
We adopt a formalism based on logic formulas, which allows us to point
out expected behaviors either in specifying correct executions, or in specifying
security violations. That offers a good flexibility and is suitable to describe as well
open policies as closed policies, respectively relative to negative authorizations
and positive authorizations [17].
5.2 Predicates of security properties
Security properties are often represented as a list of first order logic formulas that
have to be verified. We want to define some predicates to make the expression
of these formulas easier. Predicates that we introduce express the ability of an
event to start from a state (Enabled and AlwaysEnabled ) and the existence of a
transition between two states (Crossable and AlwaysCrossable).
Definition 8 (Enabled , AlwaysEnabled , Crossable and AlwaysCrossable)
Given p1 and p2 two state predicates and an event ev from a system S with
variables x, then:
Enabled(p1, ev) =ˆ ∃x · (p1 ∧ Guard(ev))
AlwaysEnabled(p1, ev) =ˆ ∀x · (p1 ⇒ Guard(ev))
Crossable(p1, ev, p2) =ˆ ∃x · (p1 ∧ 〈ev〉p2)
AlwaysCrossable(p1, ev, p2) =ˆ ∀x · (p1 ⇒ [ev]p2)
Let us note that if Enabled(p1, ev) ⇔ false , then, for each predicate p2,
AlwaysCrossable(p1, ev, p2) will be true instead of false , which is the intuitive
value expected. In the same way, if p1 is equivalent to false then AlwaysEnabled
and AlwaysCrossable are always true. Moreover, we can notice that:
Crossable(p1, ev, p2)⇒ Enabled(p1, ev)
From this definition we can deduce the properties below, relative to the impli-
cation:
Property 3 Given p1, p2 and p3 three predicates and an event ev then:
– if p1 ⇒ p3 and Enabled(p1, ev) then Enabled(p3, ev)
– if p3 ⇒ p1 and AlwaysEnabled(p1, ev) then AlwaysEnabled(p3, ev)
– if p1 ⇒ p3 and Crossable(p1, ev, p2) then Crossable(p3, ev, p2)
– if p2 ⇒ p3 and Crossable(p1, ev, p2) then Crossable(p1, ev, p3)
– if p3 ⇒ p1 and AlwaysCrossable(p1, ev, p2) then AlwaysCrossable(p3, ev, p2)
– if p2 ⇒ p3 and AlwaysCrossable(p1, ev, p2) then AlwaysCrossable(p1, ev, p3)
Here are two examples:
Reactivity of a system. The JavaCard specification imposes that any APDU
instruction is callable at any time. Given S a system and I its invariant, then
this formula can be expressed as follows:
∀ev · (ev ∈ Interface(S)⇒ AlwaysEnabled (I, ev))
Unicity of the ways to reach a state. In some cases, like access control, we
want to impose that the only way to reach a state P is to execute a particular
event Begin. If I is the invariant of S, then this property can be expressed as
follows:
∀ev · (ev ∈ Interface(S) ∧ ev 6= Begin⇒ AlwaysCrossable(I, ev,¬P ))
5.3 Property checking using GeneSyst SLTS
Security properties could be verified on B specifications, using definition 8. Nev-
ertheless, in some cases, the SLTS produced by GeneSyst can be directly ex-
ploited. Then, the verification consists in using syntactic information relative to
enabledness and reachability of transitions. Properties 4–7 list the different cases
where the predicates above can be directly established from a symbolic labelled
transition system.
Properties 4–7 share the following hypothesis: Given an event e and q1, q2
two states from a SLTS T , such as I(q1) 6⇔ false and (q1, (D,A, e), q2) ∈ WT ,
then predicates Enabled, AlwaysEnabled, Crossable and AlwaysCrossable can be
determined as follows:.
Property 4 (Enabledness condition - general case)
1. D ≡ true ⇒ Enabled(q1, e)
2. D ≡ false ⇒ ¬Enabled(q1, e)
3. D ≡ true ⇒ AlwaysEnabled(q1, e)
4. D ≡ false ⇒ ¬AlwaysEnabled (q1, e)
If the SLTS used to verify the property is minimal, then Property 4 can be
enlarged: the conditions are necessary (and sufficient) and conditions 1 and 4
are refined.
Property 5 (Enabledness for minimal SLTS)
1. D 6≡ false ⇔ Enabled(q1, e)
2. D ≡ false ⇔ ¬Enabled(q1, e)
3. D ≡ true ⇔ AlwaysEnabled(q1, e)
4. D 6≡ true ⇔ ¬AlwaysEnabled (q1, e)
In the same way, syntactic conditions to check Crossable and AlwaysCrossable
predicates are:
Property 6 (Reachability condition - general case)
5. A ≡ true ⇒ Crossable(q1, e, q2)
6. A ≡ false ∨ D ≡ false ⇒ ¬Crossable(q1, e, q2)
7. A ≡ true ∧
∀qi · (q2 6≡ qi ⇒ (q1, (D,A2, e), qi) 6∈WT ) ⇒ AlwaysCrossable(q1, e, q2)
8. A ≡ false ⇒ ¬AlwaysCrossable(q1, e, q2)
Cases 7 and 8 are not symetric, as it would be expected, because, syntacticaly,
we can just compare names of states, not the intersection of their interpretation.
Just as for enabledness, the conditions can be enlarged, when the SLTS is min-
imal, as follow:
Property 7 (Reachability for minimal SLTS)
5. A 6≡ false ⇔ Crossable(q1, e, q2)
6. A ≡ false ∨ D ≡ false ⇔ ¬Crossable(q1, e, q2)
8. A 6≡ true ⇒ ¬AlwaysCrossable(q1, e, q2)
Cases 7 and 8 are just sufficient conditions because of the limitation of the
syntactic verification. Case 7 is not present in Property 7 because it is the same
as in Property 6 Finally, Property 3 allows the deduction of derived properties
from the four properties above, by weakening or strenghtening the states.
5.4 Example of a property checking
In this section, we develop a real example of Demoney property and we do its
verification by using the SLTS given in Figure 3. In the Demoney specification
[16], the two APDU instructions InitializeTransaction and CompleteTransaction
have to be executed in sequence, without any other instructions between them
and without reaching any error state, to make a transaction. However, the card
can be withdrawn at any time (modelled by the Reset event) without generating
any error. Transaction atomicity property can be decomposed in five formulas
given below, where I stands for the invariant of the Demoney specification. More-
over, SLTS of Figure 3 is minimal and events are always enabled from all state
of the SLTS. Finally, note than the invariant I is equivalent to the union of all
state predicates (Section 3.2).
Formula 1: There exists at least a value in I such that the event Initialize-
Transaction can reach CurTransaction 6= None:
Crossable(I, InitializeT ransaction,CurTransaction 6= None)
Predicate CurTransaction 6= None directly corresponds to a state predicate.
Since there exists a transition from CurTransaction = None ∧ StatusWord =
ISO Ok to CurTransaction 6= None, labelled with [ ][G]InitializeT ransaction,
then we can use case 5 of Property 7 and conclude that the Formula 1 is true.
Formula 2: For all values, the event InitializeTransaction goes into the state
CurTransaction 6= None or into an error state:
AlwaysCrossable(I, InitializeT ransaction,
CurTransaction 6= None ∨ StatusWord 6= ISO Ok)
CurTransaction 6= None and StatusWord 6= ISO Ok are two state predicates,
and all the transitions labelled with InitializeTransaction go only in one of these
states. Then, due to case 7 of property 6, this formula is true.
Formula 3: From CurTransaction 6=None, all events, but CompleteT ransaction
and Reset, go to an error state:
∀e · (e ∈ Interface(S) ∧ e 6= CompleteT ransaction ∧ e 6= Reset⇒
AlwaysCrossable(CurTransaction 6= None, e, StatusWord 6= ISO Ok)
The two predicates correspond to state predicates and the only events which
go elsewhere than StatusWord 6= ISO Ok from CurTransaction 6= None are
CompleteTransaction and Reset. Thus Formula 4 is true (case 7 of Property 6).
Formula 4: Except InitializeTransaction, no event can reach CurTransaction
6= None:
∀e · (e ∈ Interface(S) ∧ e 6= InitializeT ransaction⇒
AlwaysCrossable(I, e,CurTransaction = None))
Predicate CurTransaction = None is the union of two existing state predicates.
So, we have to check if there exists an event, different from InitializeTransaction,
that can reach CurTransaction 6= None. Since it is not the case, this formula is
true (case 7 of Property 6).
Formula 5: No transition labelled by CompleteTransaction or Reset is reflexive
on state CurTransaction 6= None:
¬Crossable(CurTransaction 6= None,CompleteT ransaction,
CurTransaction 6= None)
and ¬Crossable(CurTransaction 6= None,Reset,CurTransaction 6= None)
CurTransaction 6= None corresponds to a state predicate and no Complete-
Transaction or Reset reflexive transition occurs. Thus this formula is true (case 5
of Property 7).
The model of Demoney is thus correct relatively to the atomicity security
property of transactions. However, during the realisation of this example, which
is a simplified Demoney applet, we found three errors due to an erroneous sim-
plification of our complete model of Demoney.
The originality of this approach is to have brought back, under some hypothe-
ses, the verification of security properties to a syntactic checking. However, it
is important to be careful about the real value of the crossing conditions gen-
erated by GeneSyst. Indeed, if some proof obligations are not (automatically)
discharged, the transitions system will have by-default transitions. Then, to
properly exploit the information, we have to be sure that the property to be
verify can be checked on a non-minimal SLTS.
6 Related works and Conclusion
The work presented here is in line with the ideas presented in [5], itself inspired
by [9]. In [5], the authors propose the construction of a labelled transition sys-
tem which is a finite state abstraction of the behavior of an event-B system.
The existence of transitions is determined by proof obligations, as here, but
the resulting transition system does not contain any information about transi-
tion crossing. Moreover, the paper does not consider the refinement step in the
diagram representation.
Other work is devoted to the translation of dynamic aspects described by
statecharts in the B formalism (for instance [13, 20]). These approaches are in-
verse of ours, because they go from a diagrammatic representation to an encoding
in a formal text. Their objective is to build a B model from UML descriptions.
On our side, we suppose that the model has been stated and we are interested
in representing the precise behavior of the system with respect to (a part of)
variables, in order to check properties, or to validate the model against the re-
quirements.
A similar approach has been envisaged for TLA [12] and extended in [6, 7]
to take in account liveness properties and refinement. As in [5], the generated
diagrams are abstractions of the system behavior.
Several tools are dedicated to the analysis of the behavior of B components by
the way of the animation of machines [4] or by local exhaustive model checking
[14]. Even if some of them allow the generation of symbolic traces, these tools can
be considered as “testing” tools. They provide particular execution sequences of
the system, not a static representation of all the behaviors. In [23], the authors
describe the generation of statecharts from event-B systems, but their approach
suffers from several restrictions and their diagrams are not symbolic.
In this paper, we have presented the GeneSyst tool, its logical foundations
and its application to the verification of security properties. In the first part,
we introduced the definition of traces of event-B systems and refinements. We
formalized the notion of symbolic labelled transition systems, with transitions
decorated by enabledness and reachability predicates. This gives a complete and
precise view of the behavior of the system, which can be exploited for various
objectives.
We described the algorithm that is implemented to generate a SLTS from a
B system and a set of states, characterized by predicates. The computation of
effective transitions between states is performed by proving proof obligations.
Due to the indecidability of the proof process, we have the choice between two
kinds of (non exclusive) results: the generation is automatic, but we can get
more transitions than in the real system, or the user completes interactively
the non-conclusive proofs and then, the resulting automaton reflects exactly the
behavior of the system.
The user can take profit of the freedom degree achieved by the choice of the
states, to obtain the best analyses useful for him/her purpose. Non classical ver-
ification techniques can be designed and implemented at this stage, to assess or
to validate the model, as it was shown in the last part of the paper. This opens
a large field of research in the domains of security properties, confidentiality,
access control, validation of models with respect to the requirements, automatic
documentation of specifications, etc. Our present research work is to develop
a set of techniques in the GECCOO2 project to express and to check security
properties, as it was sketched in the paper. We want to investigate the extrac-
tion of states from the specification of property automata, the use of refinement
to split states and achieve a suitable level of decomposition in order to check a
property. Another work is to deal with complex B models (several refinement
chains together with composition clauses sees, includes, etc.), either by com-
posing partial labelled transition systems, or by flattening a structured model
before computing the whole associated SLTS.
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Appendix
Machine of the Demoney specification (diagram in Fig. 2, Section 4.3):
machine Demoney
variables
Error ,EngagedTrans
invariant
Error ∈ BOOL ∧ EngagedTrans ∈ BOOL ∧
(Error = TRUE ⇒ EngagedTrans = FALSE) ∧
(EngagedTrans = TRUE ⇒ Error = FALSE)
assertions
/* The assertion provides the states for tool GeneSyst */
/* Here, only two states are considered according to the Error values */
Error = FALSE ∨ Error = TRUE
initialisation
Error := FALSE || EngagedTrans := FALSE
operations
Reset = begin EngagedTrans := FALSE || Error := FALSE end;
GetData =
if EngagedTrans = TRUE then
Error := TRUE || EngagedTrans := FALSE
else Error := FALSE
end;
InitializeTransaction =
if EngagedTrans = TRUE then
Error := TRUE || EngagedTrans := FALSE
else
any SW where SW ∈ BOOL then
Error := SW || EngagedTrans := bool(SW = FALSE)
end
end;
CompleteTransaction =
if EngagedTrans = FALSE then
Error := TRUE
else Error := FALSE || EngagedTrans := FALSE
end
end
Refinement of the Demoney specification (diagram in Fig. 3, Section 4.4):
refinement Demoney R1
refines Demoney
sets
TransactionType = {Credit,Debit,None};
StatusType = {ISO Error, ISO Ok}
variables
StatusWord ,CurTransaction ,ChannelIsSecured
invariant
StatusWord ∈ StatusType ∧ CurTransaction ∈ TransactionType ∧
ChannelIsSecured ∈ BOOL ∧
((StatusWord = ISO Ok) ⇔ (Error = FALSE)) ∧
((EngagedTrans = TRUE)⇔ (CurTransaction 6= None)) ∧
((CurTransaction 6= None) ⇒ ChannelIsSecured = TRUE) ∧
((StatusWord 6= ISO Ok) ⇒ (CurTransaction = None))
assertions
/* Each abstract state is decomposed in two concrete states */
/* One of these states is not reachable */
((Error = TRUE)⇔
((StatusWord 6= ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction = None)
∨ (StatusWord 6= ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction 6= None)))
∧
((Error = FALSE)⇔
((StatusWord = ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction = None)
∨ (StatusWord = ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction 6= None)))
initialisation
StatusWord := ISO Ok || ChannelIsSecured := FALSE ||
CurTransaction := None
operations
Reset = begin
StatusWord := ISO Ok || ChannelIsSecured := FALSE ||
CurTransaction := None
end;
GetData =
if CurTransaction 6= None then
StatusWord := ISO Error || CurTransaction := None
else
StatusWord := ISO Ok
end;
InitializeTransaction =
if CurTransaction 6= None ∨ ChannelIsSecured = FALSE then
StatusWord := ISO Error || CurTransaction := None
else
StatusWord :∈ StatusType ;
if StatusWord = ISO Ok then
CurTransaction :∈ {Debit, Credit}
end
end;
CompleteTransaction =
if CurTransaction = None then
StatusWord := ISO Error
else
CurTransaction := None || StatusWord := ISO Ok
end
end
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GeneSyst: a Tool to Reason about
Behavioral Aspects of B Event Specifications.
Application to Security Properties⋆
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Abstract. In this paper, we present a method and a tool to build sym-
bolic labelled transition systems from B specifications. The tool, called
GeneSyst, can take into account refinement levels and can visualize the
decomposition of abstract states in concrete hierarchical states. The re-
sulting symbolic transition system represents all the behaviors of the
initial B event system. So, it can be used to reason about them. We il-
lustrate the use of GeneSyst to check security properties on a model of
electronic purse.
1 Introduction
Formal methods, such as the B method [?], ensure that the development of an
application is reliable and that properties expressed in the model are satisfied by
the final program. However, they do not guarantee that this program fulfills the
informal requirements, nor the needs of the customer. So, it is useful to propose
several views about the specifications, in order to be sure that the initial model
is suitable for the customer and that the development can continue on this basis.
One of these important insights is the representation of the behavior of programs
by means of diagrams (statecharts). Moreover, some particular views, if they are
themselves formal, can provide new means to prove properties that cannot easily
be checked in the first model.
In this paper, we present a method and a tool to extract a labelled transition
system from a model written in event-B. The transition system gives a graphical
view and represents symbolically all the behaviors of the B model. The method
is able to take into account refinement levels and to show the correspondence
between abstract and concrete systems, by means of hierarchical states.
We present also an application of this tool, namely, the verification of secu-
rity properties. The security properties assert the occurrence or the absence of
some particular events in some situation. They are a case of atomicity property
of transactions. This is illustrated by an example of specification of an electronic
⋆ This work was done in the GECCOO project of program “ACI : Se´curite´ Informa-
tique” supported by the French Ministry of Research and New Technologies. It is
also suported by CNRS and ST-Microelectronics by the way of a doctoral grant.
purse, called Demoney[?,?], developed in the SecSafe project [?]. This case study,
written in Java Card [?], is an applet that has all the facilities required by a real
electronic purse. Indeed, the purse can be debited from a terminal in a shop, cred-
ited by cash or from a bank account with a terminal in a bank or managed from
special terminal in bank restricted area. Transactions are encrypted if needed
and different levels of security are used depending on the actions. Demoney also
supports to communicate with another applet on the card, for example, to man-
age award points on a loyalty plan. The specification of Demoney is public in
version 0.8 [?], but the source code is copyrighted by Trusted Logic S.A.1.
In Section 2, we recall the main features of event-B systems and refinements.
We introduce a notion of behavioral semantics by the way of sequences of events.
In Section 3, we define symbolic labelled transition systems (SLTS) and the
links between SLTS and event-B systems are stated. In Section 4, we present
the GeneSyst tool and an example of generation of SLTS dealing with the error
cases in the Demoney case study. Section 5 presents security properties required
in the application and shows how the GeneSyst diagrams can be used to check
these properties. Then, we review related works, and we conclude the paper with
some research perspectives in Section 6.
2 Event-B
2.1 General presentation
Event-B was introduced by J.-R. Abrial [?,?]. It is a formal development method
as well as a specification language. In event-B, components are composed of con-
stant declarations (sets, constants, properties), state specification (vari-
ables, invariant), initialisation and set of events. The events are defined by
e =̂ eBody where e is the name of the event and eBody is a guarded generalized
substitution [?]. The events do not take parameters and do not return result
values. They do not get preconditions and do terminate. Their effect is only to
modify the internal state. If S is a component, then we denote by Interface(S)
the set of its events.
A well-typed and well-defined component is consistent if initialization Init
establishes the invariant of the component and if each event preserves the invari-
ant. So, using the notation [S]R as the weakest precondition of R for substitution
S, the consistency of a component is expressed by the proof obligations: [Init ]I
and I ⇒ [eBody ]I for each event.
In the paper, we use the notions of before-after predicate of substitution
T for variables x (prdx(T )) and the feasability predicate of a substitution as
defined in the B-Book: fis(T )⇔ ¬[T ]false [?]. Finally, the notation 〈T 〉R means
¬[T ]¬R, that is to say, there exists a computation of T which terminates in a
state verifying R.
1 http://www.trusted-logic.fr/
2.2 Events and traces
The events have the form “e =̂ G =⇒ T ” where G is a predicate, T is a
generalized substitution such that I ∧ G ⇒ fis(T ). Predicate G is called the
guard of e and T is its action. They are respectively denoted by Guard(e) and
Action(e). If the syntactic definition of an event e =̂ S does not fulfill this
form, it can be built by computing e =̂ fis(S) =⇒ S. Following the so-called
event-based approach [?], the semantics of event-B systems can be chosen to be
the set of all the valid sequences of event executions.
Definition 1 (Traces of Event-B systems) A finite sequence of event occur-
rences e0.e1.e2 . . . en is a trace of system S if and only if e0 is the initialisation
of S, {e1, e2, . . . , en} ⊆ Interface(S) and fis(e0 ; e1 ; e2 ; . . . ; en)⇔ true.
The set of all the finite traces of a system S is called Traces(S). For the initial-
isation, one can notice that prdx(Init) does not depend on the initial values of
the variables and that Guard(Init)⇔ true. The following property characterizes
traces by the existence of intermediary states xi in which the guard of ei holds
and where the pair (xi, xi+1) is in the before-after predicate of event ei:
Property 1 (Trace characterization) Let x be the variable space of system
S, then: e0.e1. . . . en ∈ Traces(S) ⇔
∃x0, . . . , xn+1 ·
∧n
i=0([x := xi]Guard(ei) ∧ [x, x
′ := xi, xi+1]prdx(Action(ei)))
2.3 Event-B refinement
In the event-B method, a refinement is a component called refinement. The
variables can be refined (i.e. made more concrete) and a gluing invariant de-
scribes the relationship between the variables of the refinement and those of the
abstraction. The events of refinement R must at least contain those of the ab-
straction S (i.e. Interface(S) ⊆ Interface(R)). The other events are called new
events.
We recall here the proof obligations of system refinements. Let I be the invari-
ant of the abstraction S and J be the invariant of refinement R, then the gluing
invariant is the conjunction I∧J . The refinement is performed elementwise, that
is to say, the abstract initialisation is refined by the concrete initialisation and
each abstract event is refined by its concrete counterpart. Proof obligations that
establish the consistency of refinements are :
For initialisation Init : [InitR]〈InitS〉J
For events e of Interface(S) : I ∧ J ⇒ [eR]〈eS〉J
For the new events neR : I ∧ J ⇒ [neR]〈skip〉J
New events cannot indefinitely take the control, i.e. the refined system cannot
diverge more often that the abstract one. So, a variant V is declared in the refined
system, as an expression on a well-founded set (usually the natural numbers),
and the new events must satisfy (v is a fresh variable) :
V is a natural expression : I ∧ J ⇒ V ∈ N
New events neR decrease the variant : I ∧ J ⇒ [v := V ][neR](V < v)
Finally, a proof obligation of liveness preservation is usually required. If S con-
tains m events and R contains p new events, then:
I ∧ J ⇒ (
∨m
i=1 Guard(e
S
i )⇒ (
∨m
i=1Guard(e
R
i ) ∨
∨p
i=1 Guard(ne
R
i )))
Traces associated to refinements are defined as for the systems.
3 Symbolic labelled transition systems associated to B
systems
3.1 Symbolic transition systems
We define symbolic labelled transition systems:
Definition 2 (Symbolic labelled transition system) A symbolic labelled tran-
sition system (SLTS) is a 4-uple (N, Init , U,W ) where
- N is a set of states, and Init is the initial state (Init ∈ N)
- U is a set of labels of the form (D,A, e), where D and A are predicates and
e is an event name
- W is a transition relation W ⊆ P(N × U ×N).
A transition (E, (D,A, e), F ) means that, in state E, the event e is enabled
if D holds and, starting from state E, if event e is enabled, then it reaches state
F if A holds. Predicate D is called the enabledness predicate and A is called the
reachability predicate.
States N are interpreted as subsets of variable spaces on variables x. So, the
interpretation of N is given by a function I such that I(E) is a predicate on free
variables x which characterizes the subset represented by E. In the next defini-
tion, we determine the actual conditions to cross a transition from a particular
state value x1 of E1 to x2 of E2 by an event e which is defined in an event-B
system S. For that, e must be enabled in x1, x2 must be reachable from x1 by
e, and (x1, x2) must belong to the before-after predicate of e:
Definition 3 (Transition crossing) Let (E1, (D,A, e), E2) be a transition of
a SLTS T on a system S, and given x1 and x2 some values of the state variables
x which satisfy the invariant of S, then a crossing from x1 to x2 by this transition
is legal if and only if : 1. [x := x1](I(E1) ∧D ∧ A)
2. [x, x′ := x1, x2] prdx(Action(e))
3. [x := x2]I(E2)
Such a legal transition crossing is denoted by :
(E1, x1) 
(D,A,e)
 (E2, x2)
Now, we introduce the notion of path in a symbolic labelled transition system.
A path is a sequence of event occurrences, starting from the initial state, which
goes over a transition system through legal transition crossings.
Definition 4 (Paths) Given a symbolic labelled transition system T on a sys-
tem S, a sequence of event occurrences e0. . . . .en+1 is a path in T if there exists
a list of states E0, . . . , En+1 of N , with E0 = InitT , and a list of transitions
(Di, Ai, ei), i ∈ 0..n, such that :
∃x0, . . . , xn+1 · (
∧n
i=0((Ei, xi) 
(Di,Ai,ei)
 (Ei+1, xi+1)))
The set of all the finite paths of T is called Paths(T ).
3.2 Construction of states and transitions
The aim of this section is to show how to compute a SLTS, from an event-B
system S and given a set of states N . First, to build the states N , consider a
list of predicates {P1, . . . , Pn} on the variable space. We require that this set is
complete with respect to the invariant, i.e. all the states specified by the invariant
are included in the states determined by the Pi predicates, i.e.
I ⇒
n∨
i=1
Pi
Then, the states of the SLTS areN = {InitS , E1, . . . , En} with the interpretation
defined by:
I(InitS) = true I(Ei) = Pi ∧ I, i ∈ 1..n
We denote by N1 the set N − {InitS}. From the completeness property above
and the definition of N , we get: I ⇔
∨n
i=1 I(Ei).
Now, we express the conditions to ensure that a symbolic labelled transition
system T represents the same set of behaviors as the associated system S. For
that, in a starting state E, the enabledness condition must be equivalent to the
guard of the event e, and if the target state is F , the reachability condition must
be equivalent to the possibility to reach F through e, when the enabledness
predicate holds, so the condition:
Condition 1 (Valid transitions) Let S be a system, E and F two states in
N as defined above, and e an event, then the transition (E,(D,A,e),F) is valid if
and only if predicates D and A satisfy :
a) I(E) ⇒ (D ⇔ Guard(e))
b) I(E) ∧Guard(e) ⇒ (A ⇔ 〈Action(e)〉I(F ))
Notice that, by applying the definition of the conjugate weakest precondition,
condition b) is equivalent to :
I(E) ∧Guard(e) ⇒ (A ⇔ ∃x′ · (prdx(Action(e)) ∧ [x := x
′]I(F )))
A SLTS with all the transitions valid with respect to a system S is called a valid
symbolic labelled transition system.
Theorem 1 (Traces and paths equality) Let S be an event-B system with
invariant I and events Ev and let T be a valid symbolic labelled transition system
built from S, then:
Traces(S) = Paths(T )
Proof: We prove that, for all t, t ∈ Paths(T )⇔ t ∈ Traces(S).
The path t =̂ e0.e1. . . . .en is a path for the state sequence E0, E1, . . . , En+1 iff
(Definition 4): ∃x0, . . . , xn+1 ·
∧n
i=0((Ei, xi) 
(Di,Ai,ei)
 (Ei+1, xi+1))
By using Definition 3, we get:
∃x0, . . . , xn+1 ·
∧n
i=0([x := xi](I(Ei) ∧Di ∧Ai)
∧ [x, x′ := xi, xi+1]prdx(Action(ei)) ∧ [x := xi+1]I(Ei+1))
By Condition 1, one can replaceDi byGuard(ei) andAi by ∃x
′·(prdx(Action(ei))∧
[x := x′]I(Ei+1)). The formula above is simplified and becomes:
(1) ∃x0, . . . , xn+1 ·
∧n
i=0([x := xi](I(Ei) ∧Guard(ei))
∧ [x, x′ := xi, xi+1]prdx(Action(ei)) ∧ [x := xi+1]I(Ei+1))
We must prove that this formula is equivalent to the characterization of the
traces (Property 1):
(2) ∃x0, . . . , xn+1 ·
∧n
i=0([x := xi]Guard(ei)
∧ [x, x′ := xi, xi+1]prdx(Action(ei)) ∧ [x := xi+1]I)
Implication (1)⇒ (2) is verified because states Ei are such that I(Ei)⇒ I (Sec-
tion 3.2). To prove (2) ⇒ (1), we must exhibit a list of states E0, E1, . . . , En+1
such that these states satisfy (1). This follows from the fact that I(E0) = true
and from I ⇒
∨n
i=1 I(Ei), which ensures that one of the states I(Ei) necessarily
holds when I hold. ✷
3.3 Labelled transition systems for the refinements
We propose now the construction of a symbolic labelled transition system for
the refinements. Our aim is to highlight the links between abstract and concrete
transition systems, while preserving the overall structure of the abstract system.
One aspect of the refinement is the change of the variable representation and
redefinition of the events of the abstraction, according to the new representation.
The point is taken into account by the notion of state projection.
In the following, S is a specification, R is its refinement with gluing invariant
L, and T S is a symbolic labelled transition system for S. States ES and FS are
states in T S . We assume that the variable set xS of S is disjoint to the variable
set xR of the refinement. If some variables of the specification are kept in the
refinement, they can be renamed and an equality between both variables is added
to the invariant.
Definition 5 (State projection) Let S be a system with variables xS and R
be the refinement of S according to L. A state ER of T R, ER 6= InitR is the
projection of ES of T S , denoted by ER = ProjL(E
S), iff:
I(ER)⇔ ∃xS · (L ∧ I(ES))
We propose to build a SLTS, called ProjL(T
S), in which states are automat-
ically deduced from abstract states and gluing invariant. The SLTS projection
ProjL(T
S) of the refinement R of system S with gluing invariant L is such that:
the initial state is any q0 with I(q0) = true; the other states of the projection
are the projections of abstract states, i.e. N1R = {ProjL(q) | q ∈ N1
S}. The
transitions are (ER, (D′, A′, eR), FR) where eR ∈ R and D′, A′ are such that
Condition 1 is satisfied. A transition (ER, (D′, A′, eR), FR) is said a projection of
transition (ES , (D,A, eS), FS) iff ER = ProjL(E
S), FR = ProjL(F
S) and event
eR is the refinement of eS . By construction, Paths(ProjL(T
S)) = Traces(R).
This equality can be proved in the same way as in Theorem 1.
Property 2 (Transition projection) With the definitions above,
let (ER, (D′, A′, eR), FR) be the projection of transition (ES , (D,A, eS), FS),
then we have:
I(ES) ∧ L ∧ D′ ⇒ D
This property says that any transition enabled from a state ProjL(E
S) in a
refinement R actually must be enabled in specification S (if the refinement is
proved correct). Property 2 can make the computation of the transitions sim-
pler. Indeed, if e ∈ Interface(S), then, for all the transitions (ES , e, FS) of the
abstraction, it is only necessary to examine the transitions (ProjL(E
S), e, E′)
with E′ ∈ N1R. No other transition can be labelled by e from this state.
Another key aspect of refinement is the refinement of behaviors. New events
may be introduced that make the actions more detailed. These new events are
not observable at the abstract level, as the stuttering in TLA [?]. Very often,
new variables are introduced. Thus, it is useful to visualize the states referring
to these variable changes. In order to preserve the structure of the abstract
system, we choose to refine each abstract state in an independent way. So, the
transitions, relative to events which belong to Interface(S), are preserved by the
introduction of hierarchical states.
Definition 6 (Hierarchical states) A set of sub-states {ER1 , . . . , E
R
m} can be
associated to a super-state ProjL(E
S) of R if and only if
m∨
i=1
I(ERi )⇔ I(ProjL(E
S))
In a refined system, the user must decide what projections of abstract states
are decomposed and s/he must provide the predicates of the decomposition.
If the abstract states are disjoint, then the transitions associated to the new
events appear only between the sub-states of a hierarchical state. An example
of refinement with decomposition of states is given in Section 4.4.
4 The GeneSyst tool
4.1 Presentation
The GeneSyst tool is intended to generate a symbolic labelled transition system
T from an event-B system S and a set of states N . Such a generated SLTS
will be denoted by T (S, N). The input of the tool is a B component, where
the assertions clause contains the formula P1 ∨ . . . ∨ Pn, which characterizes
the list of predicates {P1, . . . , Pn}. By this way, the condition of completeness
(section 3.2) is generated as proof obligation.
We give a sketch of the algorithm which computes the transitions of T (S, N):
it uses three main variables: the set of visited states, visited, the set of processed
states, processed, and the set of computed transitions tr. First, the initial state
is put in the visited set. Then each state E in the visited set is processed: this
consists in computing the transitions (E, (D,A, e), F ) with all events e to all
non-initial states F of the system. Predicates D and A are determined following
the algorithm defined in the following section. If D or A are not false then the
transition (E, (D,A, e), F ) is added to tr, and if F has not been processed, it
is put in the visited set. After the processing of state E, E is removed from
visited and put in set processed. When visited is empty, then tr contains all
the computed transitions of T (S, N) and processed contains the set of reachable
states. The algorithm terminates, because the set of states to be visited is finite
(bounded by the cardinal of N). This algorithm guarantees that the resulting
SLTS is a valid transition system for S, with given states N .
4.2 Proof obligations
A subprocedure of the algorithm is to determine effectively the enabledness
predicate and the reachability predicate, given a triple (E, e, F ). For sake of
usability of the resulting transition system, it is interesting to examine three
cases: predicates are true, false or other. This information can be obtained by
proof obligations. In Fig. 1, we give the conditions for the calculus of these
predicates. Obviously, if D and/or A is false , then the transition is not possible.
Proof obligations D for (E, e, F )
(1) ∀x · (I(E) ⇒ Guard(e)) true
(2) ∀x · (I(E) ⇒ ¬Guard(e)) false
(3) ∃x · (I(E) ∧Guard(e)) Guard(e)
Proof obligations A for (E, e, F )
(4) ∀x · (I(E) ∧Guard(e) ⇒ 〈Action(e)〉I(F )) true
(5) ∀x · (I(E) ∧Guard(e) ⇒ [Action(e)]¬I(F )) false
(6) ∃x · (I(E) ∧Guard(e) ∧ 〈Action(e)〉I(F )) 〈Action(e)〉I(F )
Fig. 1. Proof obligations for enabledness and reachability
In practice, the GeneSyst tool computes the proof obligations (POs) above
and interacts with AtelierB to discharge the POs. For each triple (E, e, F ):
1. if proof obligation (1) is automatically discharged then D is true.
2. if proof obligation (2) is automatically discharged then D is false and tran-
sition (E, e, F ) does not occur in the resulting T (S, N).
3. otherwise, D is Guard(e) by default.
Then, after cases 1. and 3., GeneSyst computes the proof obligations for deter-
mining the reachability predicate A.
4. if proof obligation (4) is automatically discharged then A is true.
5. if proof obligation (5) is automatically discharged then A is false and tran-
sition (E, e, F ) does not occur in the resulting T (S, N).
6. otherwise, the transition is kept with 〈Action(e)〉 I(F ) as A, by default.
We can notice that Condition 1 about the validity of the transitions is well
satisfied by construction. The by default cases in 3. and 6. correspond to several
possibilities. Either there exist values in state E for which the transition is cross-
able (guard of e is true and state F is reachable), or there are not (the guard
is false or state F is not reachable). However, in both possibilities, these tran-
sitions are included in the resulting transition system. To manage this feature,
we define the notion of minimal symbolic labelled transition system.
Definition 7 (Minimal SLTS) A minimal SLTS is a SLTS where all the tran-
sitions are valid, i.e. satisfy a) and b) of Condition 1, and also satisfy:
c) D 6⇔ false and A 6⇔ false
A SLTS built by GeneSyst is minimal if all the proof obligations of D and A
have been effectively discharged in step 1. or 2. and step 4. or 5. in the algorithm
above. To minimize the number of by-default transitionss, we have designed two
variants of the algorithm. The first optional alternative of the algorithm is to
change cases 3. and 6. into:
3’. if proof obligation (3) is automatically discharged, then D is Guard(e) by
proof, otherwise, D is Guard(e) by default.
6’. if proof obligation (6) is automatically discharged, then A is 〈Action(e)〉 I(F )
by proof, otherwise, the transition is kept with 〈Action(e)〉 I(F ) as A by
default.
Another option of the tool allows the user to get the POs which have not been
automatically discharged. Then, s/he can do an interactive proof to complete
the work and return the information that the PO is discharged or not. However,
the interactive mode is not very practicable when there are a great number of
proof obligations that are not automatically discharged. It becomes useful to
check actually the absence of some critical transitions (cases 2. and 4.).
4.3 Transition systems associated to the Demoney case study
In Fig. 2, we give an example of transition system generated from a subset of
the abstract specification of the Demoney case study. The B machine is pro-
vided in appendix. We just have represented four methods imposed by the De-
money specification [?]: InitializeTransaction, CompleteTransaction, Reset and
GetData. The two methods InitializeTransaction and CompleteTransaction have
to be executed in sequence. If they are called in the wrong order then an er-
ror must be returned. Moreover, any other methods cannot be invoked between
them, except the method Reset which models the extraction of the card from
the terminal. If it is called during a transaction, all the internal variables must
be restored at their initial values. Finally, method GetData has been defined to
represent any other method which plays a neutral roˆle with respect to transac-
tions.
Let us notice that our model has been expressed with events. In the applet De-
money, methods have neither parameters nor result, because they communicate
through a global variable, named APDU, which allows the information transfert
between the card and the terminal. An error can be returned by means of the
same variable. Finally, methods have no precondition, because they are callable
at any time. So the transformation of methods in events is straightforward.
In the diagrams generated by GeneSyst, transitions are prefixed by the infor-
mation about predicatesD and A. A predicate denoted by “[ ]” means true, while
“[G]” means that the transition is computed by cases 3. or 6. (see section 4.2).
QInit
[ ] [ ] InitializeTransaction
[ ] [ ] CompleteTransaction [ ] [ ] Init
Error = TRUE Error = FALSE
[ ] [ ] GetData
[ ] [ ] Reset
[ ] [G] GetData
[ ] [G] GetData
[ ] [ ] Reset
[ ] [ ] InitializeTransaction 
[ ] [G] CompleteTransaction 
[ ] [ ] InitializeTransaction
[ ] [G] InitializeTransaction
[ ] [G] CompleteTransaction 
Fig. 2. Transition system associated to the error detection in the Demoney specification
Fig. 2 points out cases in which errors can occur. Transitions have no enabled-
ness condition, because all the guards are true in the model. Some reachability
conditions do not reduce to true, as for the event GetData, which is defined by:
GetData = if EngagedTrans = TRUE then
Error := TRUE || EngagedTrans := FALSE
else Error := FALSE end;
From state Error = FALSE, event GetData can reach the state Error = TRUE with
the condition EngagedTrans = TRUE and stays in Error = FALSE otherwise. Let us
remark also that GetData is enabled in state Error = TRUE and always reaches
state Error = FALSE because of the invariant Error = TRUE ⇒ EngagedTrans =
FALSE.
4.4 Transition system associated to a refinement of Demoney
In our refinement of Demoney, the boolean variable Error is changed into a value
of a given set StatusType, which intends to describe error codes, as imposed by
the specification [?]. In the same way, the boolean variable EngagedTrans is
refined into a value of a given set TransactionType , which indicates the exact
type of the current transaction. Finally, we have introduced the channel with
two levels of security (FALSE and TRUE). All this information is declared in the
invariant below (see also the refinement in appendix):
invariant
StatusWord ∈ StatusType ∧ CurTransaction ∈ TransactionType ∧
ChannelIsSecured ∈ BOOL ∧
((Error = FALSE) ⇔ (StatusWord = ISO Ok)) ∧
((EngagedTrans = FALSE) ⇔ (CurTransaction = None)) ∧
((CurTransaction 6= None) ⇒ (ChannelIsSecured = TRUE)) ∧
((StatusWord 6= ISO Ok) ⇒ (CurTransaction = None))
Fig. 3 is built from this refinement. State Error = FALSE, which corresponds
to StatusWord = ISO Ok, is split into two states according to that a transaction
is engaged or not.
[ ] [ ] Reset
[ ] [ ] GetData 
[ ] [ ] CompleteTransaction 
[ ] [ ] Reset
[ ] [ ] GetData
[ ] [ ] InitializeTransaction 
[ ] [ ] GetData 
[ ] [ ] Reset
(StatusWord = ISO_Ok & 
(StatusWord = ISO_Ok & 
[ ] [ ] InitializeTransaction
[ ] [ ] CompleteTransaction 
QInit
Error = FALSE
≠StatusWord     ISO_Ok 
[ ] [G] InitializeTransaction 
[ ] [G] InitializeTransaction 
[ ] [ ] CompleteTransaction 
  CurTransaction = None)
≠CurTransaction     None )
Error = TRUE
[ ] [ ] Init
[ ] [ ] InitializeTransaction
Fig. 3. Transition system associated to the refinement of the error detection
As expressed in Definition 6, the predicate given to GeneSyst to describe the
states has to be a conjonction of equivalences between an abstract state and a
disjonction of refined states. This predicate is written in the assertion clause.
For example, the assertion below has been used to generate Fig. 3.
((Error = TRUE) ⇔ ((StatusWord 6= ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction = None)
∨ (StatusWord 6= ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction 6= None)))
∧
((Error = FALSE) ⇔ ((StatusWord = ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction = None)
∨ (StatusWord = ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction 6= None)))
With the splitting of the state Error = FALSE, transition conditions are
simplified in true or false or, in the worst case, are unchanged. For example,
in Fig. 2, the transition labelled by [ ][G]CompleteT ransaction and going from
Error = FALSE to Error = TRUE is, in Fig. 3, going from StatusWord = ISO Ok∧
CurTransaction = None to StatusWord 6= ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction = None with
the label [ ][ ]CompleteT ransaction. So, its reachability has been made more pre-
cise. The same effect occurs on transition [ ][G]CompleteT ransaction going from
Error = FALSE to Error = FALSE, which is refined by [ ][ ]CompleteT ransaction
going from CurTransaction 6= None to CurTransaction = None in the super-state
Error = FALSE. These two specializations are directly due to the introduction of
the CurTransaction variable.
5 Verification of Security Properties on Demoney
In this section we propose a formalism to express properties relative to security
aspects and we show how GeneSyst can be used to verify these properties. We
will next give a concrete example relative to the Demoney case study.
5.1 Properties
Generally, security is designed and implemented through different levels of ab-
straction. Security policies are defined by a set of rules according to which the
system can be regulated, in order to guarantee expected properties, as confi-
dentiality or integrity. Security policies are then implemented through software
and hardware functions, called security mechanisms. Such an approach has been
adopted by the Common Criteria norm [?] which proposes, through the notion
of assurance requirements, a catalogue of security policies and a hierarchy of
mechanisms.
In this paper we focus on security properties relative to constraints on the
global behavior of the system, as authentication procedures or access control. In
this case, security requirements can be seen as constraints on the execution order
of atomic actions, as operation calls. F. Schneider claims in [?] that automata
are a well-adapted formalism which can, both, be used to specify some forms
of security policies and to control implementations during their execution. On
the other hand, K. Trentelman and M. Huisman [?] propose a logic that can be
used also to express some forms of security properties, as temporal properties
on JML specifications.
We adopt a formalism based on logic formulas, which allows us to point
out expected behaviors either in specifying correct executions, or in specifying
security violations. That offers a good flexibility and is suitable to describe as well
open policies as closed policies, respectively relative to negative authorizations
and positive authorizations [?].
5.2 Predicates of security properties
Security properties are often represented as a list of first order logic formulas that
have to be verified. We want to define some predicates to make the expression
of these formulas easier. Predicates that we introduce express the ability of an
event to start from a state (Enabled and AlwaysEnabled ) and the existence of a
transition between two states (Crossable and AlwaysCrossable).
Definition 8 (Enabled , AlwaysEnabled , Crossable and AlwaysCrossable)
Given p1 and p2 two state predicates and an event ev from a system S with
variables x, then:
Enabled(p1, ev) =ˆ ∃x · (p1 ∧ Guard(ev))
AlwaysEnabled(p1, ev) =ˆ ∀x · (p1 ⇒ Guard(ev))
Crossable(p1, ev, p2) =ˆ ∃x · (p1 ∧ 〈ev〉p2)
AlwaysCrossable(p1, ev, p2) =ˆ ∀x · (p1 ⇒ [ev]p2)
Let us note that if Enabled(p1, ev) ⇔ false , then, for each predicate p2,
AlwaysCrossable(p1, ev, p2) will be true instead of false , which is the intuitive
value expected. In the same way, if p1 is equivalent to false then AlwaysEnabled
and AlwaysCrossable are always true. Moreover, we can notice that:
Crossable(p1, ev, p2)⇒ Enabled(p1, ev)
From this definition we can deduce the properties below, relative to the impli-
cation:
Property 3 Given p1, p2 and p3 three predicates and an event ev then:
– if p1 ⇒ p3 and Enabled(p1, ev) then Enabled(p3, ev)
– if p3 ⇒ p1 and AlwaysEnabled(p1, ev) then AlwaysEnabled(p3, ev)
– if p1 ⇒ p3 and Crossable(p1, ev, p2) then Crossable(p3, ev, p2)
– if p2 ⇒ p3 and Crossable(p1, ev, p2) then Crossable(p1, ev, p3)
– if p3 ⇒ p1 and AlwaysCrossable(p1, ev, p2) then AlwaysCrossable(p3, ev, p2)
– if p2 ⇒ p3 and AlwaysCrossable(p1, ev, p2) then AlwaysCrossable(p1, ev, p3)
Here are two examples:
Reactivity of a system. The JavaCard specification imposes that any APDU
instruction is callable at any time. Given S a system and I its invariant, then
this formula can be expressed as follows:
∀ev · (ev ∈ Interface(S)⇒ AlwaysEnabled (I, ev))
Unicity of the ways to reach a state. In some cases, like access control, we
want to impose that the only way to reach a state P is to execute a particular
event Begin. If I is the invariant of S, then this property can be expressed as
follows:
∀ev · (ev ∈ Interface(S) ∧ ev 6= Begin⇒ AlwaysCrossable(I, ev,¬P ))
5.3 Property checking using GeneSyst SLTS
Security properties could be verified on B specifications, using definition 8. Nev-
ertheless, in some cases, the SLTS produced by GeneSyst can be directly ex-
ploited. Then, the verification consists in using syntactic information relative to
enabledness and reachability of transitions. Properties 4–7 list the different cases
where the predicates above can be directly established from a symbolic labelled
transition system.
Properties 4–7 share the following hypothesis: Given an event e and q1, q2
two states from a SLTS T , such as I(q1) 6⇔ false and (q1, (D,A, e), q2) ∈ WT ,
then predicates Enabled, AlwaysEnabled, Crossable and AlwaysCrossable can be
determined as follows:.
Property 4 (Enabledness condition - general case)
1. D ≡ true ⇒ Enabled(q1, e)
2. D ≡ false ⇒ ¬Enabled(q1, e)
3. D ≡ true ⇒ AlwaysEnabled(q1, e)
4. D ≡ false ⇒ ¬AlwaysEnabled (q1, e)
If the SLTS used to verify the property is minimal, then Property 4 can be
enlarged: the conditions are necessary (and sufficient) and conditions 1 and 4
are refined.
Property 5 (Enabledness for minimal SLTS)
1. D 6≡ false ⇔ Enabled(q1, e)
2. D ≡ false ⇔ ¬Enabled(q1, e)
3. D ≡ true ⇔ AlwaysEnabled(q1, e)
4. D 6≡ true ⇔ ¬AlwaysEnabled (q1, e)
In the same way, syntactic conditions to check Crossable and AlwaysCrossable
predicates are:
Property 6 (Reachability condition - general case)
5. A ≡ true ⇒ Crossable(q1, e, q2)
6. A ≡ false ∨ D ≡ false ⇒ ¬Crossable(q1, e, q2)
7. A ≡ true ∧
∀qi · (q2 6≡ qi ⇒ (q1, (D,A2, e), qi) 6∈WT ) ⇒ AlwaysCrossable(q1, e, q2)
8. A ≡ false ⇒ ¬AlwaysCrossable(q1, e, q2)
Cases 7 and 8 are not symetric, as it would be expected, because, syntacticaly,
we can just compare names of states, not the intersection of their interpretation.
Just as for enabledness, the conditions can be enlarged, when the SLTS is min-
imal, as follow:
Property 7 (Reachability for minimal SLTS)
5. A 6≡ false ⇔ Crossable(q1, e, q2)
6. A ≡ false ∨ D ≡ false ⇔ ¬Crossable(q1, e, q2)
8. A 6≡ true ⇒ ¬AlwaysCrossable(q1, e, q2)
Cases 7 and 8 are just sufficient conditions because of the limitation of the
syntactic verification. Case 7 is not present in Property 7 because it is the same
as in Property 6 Finally, Property 3 allows the deduction of derived properties
from the four properties above, by weakening or strenghtening the states.
5.4 Example of a property checking
In this section, we develop a real example of Demoney property and we do its
verification by using the SLTS given in Figure 3. In the Demoney specification [?],
the two APDU instructions InitializeTransaction and CompleteTransaction have
to be executed in sequence, without any other instructions between them and
without reaching any error state, to make a transaction. However, the card can
be withdrawn at any time (modelled by the Reset event) without generating any
error. Transaction atomicity property can be decomposed in five formulas given
below, where I stands for the invariant of the Demoney specification. Moreover,
SLTS of Figure 3 is minimal and events are always enabled from all state of the
SLTS. Finally, note than the invariant I is equivalent to the union of all state
predicates (Section 3.2).
Formula 1: There exists at least a value in I such that the event Initialize-
Transaction can reach CurTransaction 6= None:
Crossable(I, InitializeT ransaction,CurTransaction 6= None)
Predicate CurTransaction 6= None directly corresponds to a state predicate.
Since there exists a transition from CurTransaction = None ∧ StatusWord =
ISO Ok to CurTransaction 6= None, labelled with [ ][G]InitializeT ransaction,
then we can use case 5 of Property 7 and conclude that the Formula 1 is true.
Formula 2: For all values, the event InitializeTransaction goes into the state
CurTransaction 6= None or into an error state:
AlwaysCrossable(I, InitializeT ransaction,
CurTransaction 6= None ∨ StatusWord 6= ISO Ok)
CurTransaction 6= None and StatusWord 6= ISO Ok are two state predicates,
and all the transitions labelled with InitializeTransaction go only in one of these
states. Then, due to case 7 of property 6, this formula is true.
Formula 3: From CurTransaction 6=None, all events, but CompleteT ransaction
and Reset, go to an error state:
∀e · (e ∈ Interface(S) ∧ e 6= CompleteT ransaction ∧ e 6= Reset⇒
AlwaysCrossable(CurTransaction 6= None, e, StatusWord 6= ISO Ok)
The two predicates correspond to state predicates and the only events which
go elsewhere than StatusWord 6= ISO Ok from CurTransaction 6= None are
CompleteTransaction and Reset. Thus Formula 4 is true (case 7 of Property 6).
Formula 4: Except InitializeTransaction, no event can reach CurTransaction
6= None:
∀e · (e ∈ Interface(S) ∧ e 6= InitializeT ransaction⇒
AlwaysCrossable(I, e,CurTransaction = None))
Predicate CurTransaction = None is the union of two existing state predicates.
So, we have to check if there exists an event, different from InitializeTransaction,
that can reach CurTransaction 6= None. Since it is not the case, this formula is
true (case 7 of Property 6).
Formula 5: No transition labelled by CompleteTransaction or Reset is reflexive
on state CurTransaction 6= None:
¬Crossable(CurTransaction 6= None,CompleteT ransaction,
CurTransaction 6= None)
and ¬Crossable(CurTransaction 6= None,Reset,CurTransaction 6= None)
CurTransaction 6= None corresponds to a state predicate and no Complete-
Transaction or Reset reflexive transition occurs. Thus this formula is true (case 5
of Property 7).
The model of Demoney is thus correct relatively to the atomicity security
property of transactions. However, during the realisation of this example, which
is a simplified Demoney applet, we found three errors due to an erroneous sim-
plification of our complete model of Demoney.
The originality of this approach is to have brought back, under some hypothe-
ses, the verification of security properties to a syntactic checking. However, it
is important to be careful about the real value of the crossing conditions gen-
erated by GeneSyst. Indeed, if some proof obligations are not (automatically)
discharged, the transitions system will have by-default transitions. Then, to
properly exploit the information, we have to be sure that the property to be
verify can be checked on a non-minimal SLTS.
6 Related works and Conclusion
The work presented here is in line with the ideas presented in [?], itself inspired
by [?]. In [?], the authors propose the construction of a labelled transition sys-
tem which is a finite state abstraction of the behavior of an event-B system.
The existence of transitions is determined by proof obligations, as here, but
the resulting transition system does not contain any information about transi-
tion crossing. Moreover, the paper does not consider the refinement step in the
diagram representation.
Other work is devoted to the translation of dynamic aspects described by
statecharts in the B formalism (for instance [?,?]). These approaches are inverse
of ours, because they go from a diagrammatic representation to an encoding in
a formal text. Their objective is to build a B model from UML descriptions.
On our side, we suppose that the model has been stated and we are interested
in representing the precise behavior of the system with respect to (a part of)
variables, in order to check properties, or to validate the model against the
requirements.
A similar approach has been envisaged for TLA [?] and extended in [?,?]
to take in account liveness properties and refinement. As in [?], the generated
diagrams are abstractions of the system behavior.
Several tools are dedicated to the analysis of the behavior of B components by
the way of the animation of machines [?] or by local exhaustive model checking
[?]. Even if some of them allow the generation of symbolic traces, these tools can
be considered as “testing” tools. They provide particular execution sequences of
the system, not a static representation of all the behaviors. In [?], the authors
describe the generation of statecharts from event-B systems, but their approach
suffers from several restrictions and their diagrams are not symbolic.
In this paper, we have presented the GeneSyst tool, its logical foundations
and its application to the verification of security properties. In the first part,
we introduced the definition of traces of event-B systems and refinements. We
formalized the notion of symbolic labelled transition systems, with transitions
decorated by enabledness and reachability predicates. This gives a complete and
precise view of the behavior of the system, which can be exploited for various
objectives.
We described the algorithm that is implemented to generate a SLTS from a
B system and a set of states, characterized by predicates. The computation of
effective transitions between states is performed by proving proof obligations.
Due to the indecidability of the proof process, we have the choice between two
kinds of (non exclusive) results: the generation is automatic, but we can get
more transitions than in the real system, or the user completes interactively
the non-conclusive proofs and then, the resulting automaton reflects exactly the
behavior of the system.
The user can take profit of the freedom degree achieved by the choice of the
states, to obtain the best analyses useful for him/her purpose. Non classical ver-
ification techniques can be designed and implemented at this stage, to assess or
to validate the model, as it was shown in the last part of the paper. This opens
a large field of research in the domains of security properties, confidentiality,
access control, validation of models with respect to the requirements, automatic
documentation of specifications, etc. Our present research work is to develop
a set of techniques in the GECCOO2 project to express and to check security
properties, as it was sketched in the paper. We want to investigate the extrac-
tion of states from the specification of property automata, the use of refinement
to split states and achieve a suitable level of decomposition in order to check a
property. Another work is to deal with complex B models (several refinement
chains together with composition clauses sees, includes, etc.), either by com-
posing partial labelled transition systems, or by flattening a structured model
before computing the whole associated SLTS.
2 “Ge´ne´ration de Code Certifie´ Oriente´ Objet”. Project of Program “ACI Se´curite´
Informatique”, 2003.
Appendix
Machine of the Demoney specification (diagram in Fig. 2, Section 4.3):
machine Demoney
variables
Error ,EngagedTrans
invariant
Error ∈ BOOL ∧ EngagedTrans ∈ BOOL ∧
(Error = TRUE ⇒ EngagedTrans = FALSE) ∧
(EngagedTrans = TRUE ⇒ Error = FALSE)
assertions
/* The assertion provides the states for tool GeneSyst */
/* Here, only two states are considered according to the Error values */
Error = FALSE ∨ Error = TRUE
initialisation
Error := FALSE || EngagedTrans := FALSE
operations
Reset = begin EngagedTrans := FALSE || Error := FALSE end;
GetData =
if EngagedTrans = TRUE then
Error := TRUE || EngagedTrans := FALSE
else Error := FALSE
end;
InitializeTransaction =
if EngagedTrans = TRUE then
Error := TRUE || EngagedTrans := FALSE
else
any SW where SW ∈ BOOL then
Error := SW || EngagedTrans := bool(SW = FALSE)
end
end;
CompleteTransaction =
if EngagedTrans = FALSE then
Error := TRUE
else Error := FALSE || EngagedTrans := FALSE
end
end
Refinement of the Demoney specification (diagram in Fig. 3, Section 4.4):
refinement Demoney R1
refines Demoney
sets
TransactionType = {Credit,Debit,None};
StatusType = {ISO Error, ISO Ok}
variables
StatusWord ,CurTransaction ,ChannelIsSecured
invariant
StatusWord ∈ StatusType ∧ CurTransaction ∈ TransactionType ∧
ChannelIsSecured ∈ BOOL ∧
((StatusWord = ISO Ok) ⇔ (Error = FALSE)) ∧
((EngagedTrans = TRUE) ⇔ (CurTransaction 6= None)) ∧
((CurTransaction 6= None) ⇒ ChannelIsSecured = TRUE) ∧
((StatusWord 6= ISO Ok) ⇒ (CurTransaction = None))
assertions
/* Each abstract state is decomposed in two concrete states */
/* One of these states is not reachable */
((Error = TRUE) ⇔
((StatusWord 6= ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction = None)
∨ (StatusWord 6= ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction 6= None)))
∧
((Error = FALSE) ⇔
((StatusWord = ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction = None)
∨ (StatusWord = ISO Ok ∧ CurTransaction 6= None)))
initialisation
StatusWord := ISO Ok || ChannelIsSecured := FALSE ||
CurTransaction := None
operations
Reset = begin
StatusWord := ISO Ok || ChannelIsSecured := FALSE ||
CurTransaction := None
end;
GetData =
if CurTransaction 6= None then
StatusWord := ISO Error || CurTransaction := None
else
StatusWord := ISO Ok
end;
InitializeTransaction =
if CurTransaction 6= None ∨ ChannelIsSecured = FALSE then
StatusWord := ISO Error || CurTransaction := None
else
StatusWord :∈ StatusType ;
if StatusWord = ISO Ok then
CurTransaction :∈ {Debit, Credit}
end
end;
CompleteTransaction =
if CurTransaction = None then
StatusWord := ISO Error
else
CurTransaction := None || StatusWord := ISO Ok
end
end
